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WA TTER 'S ABOUT TO RUN DRY FOR NATIONAL
BANKS USING OPERATING SUBSIDIARIES TO




In the wake of the "Great Recession," the Obama administration
seemed poised for a complete overhaul of the financial service regulatory
environment. As part of that plan, the administration proposed the creation
of a new agency, the Consumer Financial Protection Agency' that would be
armed with regulatory powers to fight for consumer protection. The
proposed agency has been heralded as the tool the government needs to
fight against Wall Street for the people of Main Street, with many
proclaiming that no longer will big banks operate under rules that they
created.2 Alternatively, critics of the agency have damned the proposal as
creating an independent credit czar that will stifle innovation resulting in
increased costs for consumers. Coming as no surprise, considering the
current partisanship of our government, the lines were drawn largely on
party lines. Democrats generally supported the idea and Republicans
generally opposed the plan.4
Juris Doctor, The Ohio State University Moritz College of Law, expected 2011.
'Hereinafter CFPA.
2 Press Release, House Speaker Nancy Pelosi, Today's Action by Financial
Services Committee Brings Accountability to Wall Street and Big Banks (Dec. 2,
12, 2009), available at http://www.speaker.gov/newsroom/pressreleases?id=1459
("Today's action by the House Financial Services Committee brings accountability
to Wall Street and big banks. When coupled with strong reforms to protect
consumers and Main Street... it will end the reckless practices that resulted in the
worst financial crisis since the Great Depression.").
' H.R. 4173, 111th Cong. (2009) [hearinafter H.R. 4173 Open Congress]; see also
OpenCongress, http://www.opencongress.org/billI 11-h4173/actions votes (on
December 11, 2009, the United States House of Representatives passed H.R. 4173,
legislation proposed to create the CFPA with 223 in favor of the bill, 202 against
the bill and 9 abstaining from the vote. No Republicans voted in favor of the bill).
4 Id. See also Press Release, GOP, Democrats Financial Reforms Show Contempt
for Capitalism and Continue to Destroy Jobs (Nov. 23, 2009), available at
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However, those traditional lines seem blurred when one takes a
closer look at the legislation and how it treats the issue of federal
preemption for subsidiaries of nationally chartered banks. After the decision
in Watters v. Wachovia Bank, Federal regulations preempt state regulations
for operating subsidiaries of nationally chartered banks, even though "the
operating subsidiaries" may be state chartered. The Bills that propose to
create the Consumer Financial Protection Agency, however, purport to
overturn that decision by clarifying that subsidiaries will be subject to state
law the same as any other state entity. Ostensibly, it seems that this reversal
of federal preemption is a compromise between supporters of the bill;
Democrats who traditionally favor federal action- and Republicans, who
traditionally favor a smaller federal government and stronger state
governments. Could it be a bipartisan compromise from a partisan
government?
This note will take a critical look at this proposition. By looking at
the dual banking system through the lens of consumer protection laws, this
Note proposes that Federalist principles have little to do with legislation
purporting to overturn Watters v. Wachovia Bank. Rather, I argue that the
real purpose behind such action is to subject banks to state regulation that is
more progressive in the area of consumer protection. I will not address
whether or not increased regulation over banks for consumer protection is
in the best interest of the consumer, i.e. does it just decrease available credit
and increase costs that the consumer will pay for later? Rather, I will
attempt to describe what benefits and costs federally chartered banks will
have in the future if they continue to operate through an operating
subsidiary instead of fully integrating operations into their company.
Part H of this Note describes the administration's proposal to create
the Consumer Financial Protection Agency. I will first outline the agency
generally, and then I will describe the various reactions to the proposal to
illustrate how traditional partisan interests are blurred by the operational
effects of the proposal. Finally, I will describe the particular provision in
H.R. 4173 that overturns the decision of Watters v. Wachovia Bank.
Part III of this Note describes the Watters v. Wachovia Bank
decision as well as the reactions to it and the interests implicated. First, I
will take a close look at the decision itself from the Court's perspective on
the legal questions involved. Then I will describe the various interested
parties. Through this lens, it will become apparent that the decision, like the
provision in H.R. 4173, cuts across traditionally similar interests.
Part IV of the Note looks into the dual banking system and how
predatory lending laws have developed. I will first describe the dual
http://www.gop.gov/policy-news/09/11/23/democrats-financial-reforms-show-
contempt.
5 Watters v. Wachovia Bank, 550 U.S. 1 (2007).
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banking system, generally, to gain some perspective on the pro-competitive
reasons why people may support banks being able to choose who regulates
them. Then I will look into the predatory lending problem and what laws
are employed in an effort to protect consumers. Third, I will look into what
federal predatory lending laws are currently in effect and how they are
operating. Finally, I will look into state predatory lending laws through the
lens of North Carolina and Massachusetts. While these states are considered
to be very active in the predatory lending legal environment, I choose to
look into them because they are indicative of the general trend toward
progressive reform in the area of predatory lending.
Part V of the Note will compare federal and state predatory lending
laws. Although not exhaustive, the examples I use indicate a larger trend
toward federal laws being more concerned about creating a competitive
banking environment and state laws being more concerned with protecting
consumers.
Part VI of the Note looks into the motivations for nationally
chartered banks to operate through a subsidiary and how the federal versus
state predatory lending laws comparison may play a role in that. I argue that
it does play a role, and therefore, legislation purporting to overturn Watters
v. Wachovia Bank will have an effect on the number of banks that are
federally chartered and the ease by which smaller banks will be able to
compete with the smaller number of federally-regulated banks.
Finally, Part VII of the Note looks into the effects of the proposed
legislation on the structure of banking operations and financial markets.
While a significant trend is unlikely, the decision banks make about their
operating subsidiaries will be indicative of the true cost of increased
consumer protection legislation.
II. THE CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION AGENCY
In response to what many people believe to be the worst financial
crisis since The Great Depression, the Obama Administration proposed
changes to the financial service regulatory arena in the form of a ninety-
page document called the President's "White Paper."6 The White Paper laid
the foundation from which the administration would seek to accomplish
five objectives: (1) promote robust supervision of financial firms; (2)
establish comprehensive supervision of financial markets; (3) protect
6 U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, NEW FOUNDATION: REBUILDING FINANcIAL
SUPERVISION AND REGULATION 3-4 (2009), available at
http://www.financialstability.gov/docs/regs/FinalReport-web.pdf [hereinafter
White Paper].
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consumers and investors from financial abuse; (4) provide the government
with the tools it needs to manage financial crises; and (5) raise international
regulatory standards.
A. Generally
On June 30, 2009, the Obama administration made its first
legislative proposal seeking to implement these objectives by introducing
the Consumer Financial Protection Act of 2009.8 The Act proposed a new
independent executive agency charged with the responsibility of enforcing
most of the consumer protection laws.9 The Act gives the agency the
authority over a vast array of financial activities including mortgages,
deposit taking, credit cards, collection of consumer report data, debt
collection, real estate settlements, and others.'o Under this Act, the CFPA
would not have authority over insurance activities other than mortgages,
title and credit insurance; however, as seen from how the act defines
"covered person," the range of entities engaged in financial activities that
would be subjected to oversight of the CFPA is very expansive." Similarly,
the Act gives the CFPA wide latitude in determining what constitutes a
"consumer product."l 2 Once something is characterized by the agency as a
consumer product, the CFPA would be able to prohibit unfair rules
7 Id. See also Binyamin Applebaum & David Cho, Obama Blueprint Deepens
Federal Role in Markets, WASH. POST, June 17, 2009,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2009/06/16/AR2009061601887.html.
8 Consumer Financial Protection Agency Act of 2009, H.R. 3126, 111th Cong.
(2009), available at
http://www.financialstability.gov/docs/CFPA-Act.pdf.
9 David S. Evans & Joshua Wright, How the Consumer Financial Protection
Agency Act of2009 would Change the Law and Regulation of Consumer Financial
Products, 2 BLOOMBERG L. REP. No.10 (2009) (citing CFPA Act § 1011(a))
("There is established the Consumer Financial Protection Agency as an
independent agency in the executive branch to regulate the provision of consumer
financial products or services under this title, the enumerated consumer laws, and
the authorities transferred under subtitles F and H.").
1o DAVID H. CARPENTER & MARK JICKLING, CRS REPORT FOR CONGRESS:
FINANCIAL REGULATORY REFORM: ANALYSIS OF THE CFPA (2009),
http://assets.opencrs.com/rpts/R40696_20090717.pdf.
" H.R. 3126, § 1001(9) ("any person who engages directly or indirectly in a
financial activity, in connection with the provision of a consumer financial product
or service [used primarily for personal, family, or household purposes]; or any [one
who] provides a material service to, or processes a transaction on behalf of, [such]
a person.").
12 CARPENTER & JICKLING, supra note 10, at 2 (citing William Kovaic, The
Consumer Financial Protection Agency and the Hazards ofRegulatory
Restructuring, LOMBARD ST., Sept. 14, 2009, at 19, 25-26).
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regarding that product, prescribe rules requiring disclosures of the costs,
benefits, and risks for that product, and other actions.' 3
Under the Act, the CFPA will have a range of powerful rule
making abilities, as the CFPA would be given the authority to promulgate
rules and issue guidance in order to meet the objectives of the act.14 The
only limitations on the rule making power of the agency comes from the
various requirements of their justification for action.'5 Perhaps the most
controversial 6 power the CFPA would have is the ability to define a
"standard consumer product" and require consumers to opt out of the
standard product before being offered alternative products.17
B. Responses to the CFPA
In response to the administration's proposal of the CFPA, Financial
Service Committee Chairman Barney Frank introduced H.R. 3126, which
largely mirrors the CFPA Act, on July 8, 2009.18 Then, on December 2,
2009, Congressman Frank introduced a new bill, H.R. 4173, The Wall
Street Reform and Consumer Financial Protection Act of 2009, which
authorizes the creation of the CFPA.'9 Both resolutions mirrored the
administration's proposal, although many provisions, including the plain
13 CARPENTER & JICKLING, supra note 10, at 2.
14 CFPA Act, supra note 8, § 102 1(a) (the objective of the CFPA would be "to
promote transparency, simplicity, fairness, and accountability for consumer
financial products and services other than those regulated by the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC) and the Commodity Futures Trading Commission
(CFTC)").
15 For example, CFPA Act § 1031 (b) requires that for rule making: "The Agency
may prescribe rules identifying as unlawful unfair, deceptive, or abusive acts or
practices in connection with any transaction with a consumer for a consumer
financial product or service." CFPA Act, supra note 8, § 1031(b).
1 See generally Peter Wallison Unfree to Choose: The Administration's Consumer
Financial Protection Agency, AEl FIN. SERV. OUTLOOK, July 9, 2009,
http://www.aei.org/outlook/100056. "The real trouble begins, however, when the
administration's plan gets beyond the relatively simple issue of disclosure and
proposes that the CFPA define standards for what the white paper calls "plain
vanilla" products and services. The draft legislation describes them as "standard
consumer financial products or services" that will be both "transparent" and "lower
risk." According to the white paper, the CFPA will have authority "to require all
providers and intermediaries to offer these products prominently, alongside
whatever other lawful products they choose to offer." (citing CFPA Act
§1031(b)(1)).
'7 CARPENTER & JICKLING, supra note 10, at 2 (citing CFPA Act §1031(b)(1)).
8 H.R. 3126.
' H.R. 4173.
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vanilla formula,2 0 were dropped.2 ' On December 11, 2009, the United
States House of Representatives passed H.R. 4173 with 223 in favor of the
bill, 202 against the bill and 9 abstaining from the vote.22 The vote received
no bipartisan support, as no Republicans voted for the bill.
In the opinion of congressional Republicans, the new agency would
be created in "contempt of capitalism," as it would stifle innovation, and
would continue to destroy jobs.24Additionally, major special interests such
as the American Bankers Association, the National Association of Federal
Credit Unions, the U.S. Chamber of Commerce and the Mortgage Bankers
Association among others publicly opposed the bill.25
Democrats, however, characterized the bill as a triumph of
democracy, and a signal of the government willing to fight Wall Street to
20 The Obama administration uses this term to describe products that are simpler
and have straightforward pricing. See White Paper, supra note 6, at 2.
21 MICH. BANKERS ASS'N, LEGISLATION SYNOPSIS: H.R. 4173 THE WALL STREET
REFORM AND CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT (2009), available at http://
www.mibankers.com/downloads/Resources/SynopsisHR4173.pdf.
22 OpenCongress, supra note 3.
23 Id. See also Posting of Anjai Desai to Alston Bird Financial Market Crisis Blog,
http://www.alston.com/financialmarketscrisisblog/?entry-2697 (Oct. 16, 2009,
15:17 EST) ("Republican opposition to the bill articulated that the proposed agency
would have "excessive, unprecedented regulation" and it would result in the
restriction of credit and product innovation and consumer protection"); "Democrats
summarized the Consumer Financial Protection agency as: "a new, independent
federal agency solely devoted to protecting Americans from unfair and abusive
financial products and services." Id.
24 GOP, supra note 4. "This proposal would establish an independent agency in the
executive branch to regulate financial products and services. An unelected "credit
czar" would be able to dictate what financial products could be offered and at what
terms, drastically reducing the number of financial products available and driving
up the cost of credit."
25 OpenCongress, http://www.opencongress.org/bill/ 111 -h4173/money; see also
Press Release, Edward Yingling, ABA Statement on House Passage of Financial
Regulatory Reform Bill (Dec. 11, 2009), available at
http://www.aba.com/Press+Room/121109ReformBillHR4173.htm; Letter from
John A. Courson on behalf of the Mortgage Bankers Association to House Speaker
Pelosi (Dec. 9, 2009), available at
www.mbaa.org/files/ResourceCenter/MIRA/LetterOpposingHR4173.pdf; Letter
from R. Bruce Joston to the Members of the U.S. House of Representatives (Dec.
10, 2001), http://www.uschamber.com/issues/letters/2009/091210_hr4173.htm;
Nat'l Ass'n of Fed. Credit Unions, News: House Clears H.R. 4173 223-302, Dec.
11,2009,
http://www.nafcu.org/Template.cfn?Section=News&template=/contentManageme
nt/contentDisplay.cfn&contentlD-44758; see also GOP, supra note 4 (noting that
in addition to these agencies, twenty-one other industry trade associations are
opposed to this bill).
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protect the consumers on Main Street.26 Similarly, scholars like Elizabeth
Warren 27 maintain that the agency will arm the government with the tools
they need to combat the abusive practices of Wall Street to promote the
well-being of the middle class.28 Other scholars argue that the current
regulatory environment places a higher value on protecting the interests of
the consumer vendors instead of protecting the consumers, and this new
agency is an appropriate response to the situation.29
While the debate over the new agency certainly cuts across
traditional debates about the precise role of government in their regulation
of the marketplace in order to protect consumers, a more practical approach
may be to analyze the role that this new agency will have in light of the
current shortcomings of consumer protection regulation.30 For example,
26 Press Release, House Speaker Nancy Pelosi, Pelosi: 'Today's Action by
Financial Services Committee Brings Accountability to Wall Street and Big Banks'
(Dec. 12, 2009), available at
http://www.speaker.gov/newsroom/pressreleases?id=1459. "Today's action by the
House Financial Services Committee brings accountability to Wall Street and big
banks. When coupled with strong reforms to protect consumers and Main
Street... it will end the reckless practices that resulted in the worst financial crisis
since the Great Depression." Id.
27 Elizabeth Warren is the Leo Gotlieb Professor of Law at Harvard Law School
and the Chair of the Congressional Oversight Committee. See Congressional
Oversight Panel, http://cop.senate.gov/about/bio-warren.cfn (last visited Mar. 25,
2010).
28 Shahien Nasiripour, Will The Banks Win Again? Bailout Watchdog Rallies
Support for Consumer Protection Agency: Elizabeth Warren Letter, HUFFINGTON
POsT.COM, Jan. 19, 2010, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2010/01/19/will-the-
banks-win-again n 427652.html ("The fate of the Consumer Financial Protection
Agency will be the best way to follow the story moving forward because consumer
products were the most abusive and because the CFPA has real muscle to stop
those abuses. The CFPA would hire new cops and change the way big banks do
business ... The next few weeks will determine whether families will have to play
by rules written by the banks and for the banks - rules that let the industry get away
with anything. In my view, we cannot let families lose again.").
29 Letter from Professors of Consumer Law and Banking Law to Senators Dodd
and Shelby and Representatives Frank and Bauchus, (Sept. 29, 2009), available at
http://law.hofstra.edu/pdflMedia/consumer-law/o209-28-09.pdf.
30 See Sharon Tennyson, Analyzing the Role for a Consumer Financial Protection
Agency (Networks Fin. Inst. Policy Brief, Dec. 2009), available at
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfn?abstractid=1525603 ("In the debate, much
attention has been given to discussion of whether consumers are irrational and need
paternalistic regulators to look after them, and whether inadequate consumer
protection regulation was a contributor to the financial crisis. While politically
engaging, these arguments risk distracting attention from two important principles
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political debates center around the rationality of the consumer to argue for
more regulation to protect these people.3' On the one hand, there should be
less regulation to encourage these actors to become more rationale.32 On the
other, regulations over consumer protection are warranted regardless of the
rationality of the consumers. Therefore, the debate over the new agency
should be more about specifics and less about generalities.
C. Operating Subsidiaries ofNational Banks and H.R. 3126, 4173
In response to many officials, including Congressman Frank,
arguing that preemption of state laws hurts the ability of states to protect
consumers 34 , proposed H.R. 3126 amends the National Bank Act 35 and
Home Owners Loan Act 6 to make non-depository institution subsidiaries,
or affiliates of federally charted banks, subject to state consumer financial
laws.3 7 It is not as clear whether this will also apply to subsidiaries of
[federally chartered thrifts, as the preemption provision applicable to
federally chartered thrift discourages state preemption by including the
language of "and consistent with Federal law for those entities.]" 3 8 In
making these changes, the proposed legislation renders the 2007 Supreme
Court decision in Watters v. Wachovia Bank,39 upholding the OCC's40
that should be at the heart of the discussion. First, consumer protection regulation is
provided by all financial regulators and is warranted irrespective of the rationality
of consumers or the immediacy of financial crises. Second, the need to modernize
U.S. financial services regulation is clear and regulatory reorganization is an
important part of that agenda.").
31 See GOP, supra note 4 (arguing that regulation is not the answer to the problem
because the costs will shift to consumers making the lending process more
burdensome on them).
32 See Laurie A. Burlingame, A Pro-Consumer Approach to Predatory Lending:
Enhanced Protection Through Federal Legislation and New Approaches to
Education, 60 CONSUMER FIN. L.Q. REP. 460 (2006) (arguing that in addition to
federal regulation, novel educational reforms are needed to offer meaningful
protection for the majority of mortgage loans.).
3 See Tennyson, supra note 30.
34 Posting of David L. Beam to Global Financial Market Watch Blog,
http://globalfinancialmarketwatch.com (Dec. 16, 2009).
" 12 U.S.C. § 38 (2006).
36 12 U.S.C. § 1461 (2006) [hereinafter referred to as HOLA].
3 H.R. 3126, § 145-148 ("no provision of this title shall be construed as annulling,
altering or affecting the applicability of State law to any non-depository institution,
subsidiary, other affiliate, or agent of a national bank"). See also Broox W.
Peterson, The Consumer Financial Protection Agency: Different Ship, Same
Chairs?, 11 BANKING & FIN. SERVICES POL'Y REP. 1, 9 (2009).
38 See Peterson, supra note 37, at 9 (concluding that "it is not clear what the status
of subsidiaries and affiliates of federally chartered thrifts will be, given the added
language described above.").
3 Watters, 550 U.S. at 1.
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preemption of state consumer protection laws regulating operating
subsidiaries of national banks who were themselves state charted,4'
obsolete.42
H.R. 4173 slightly alters the provision, clarifying state law
preemption standards for subsidiaries by only amending HOLA, not the
National Bank Act. Because the Watters decision was based on a lack of
direction from HOLA, many commentators expect that given the express
language of the statute, the legislation will eliminate preemption for
operating subsidiaries of national banks and federal thrifts.4
For those who favor the bill, H.R. 4173 § 4407(a) will have the
effect of enhancing the effort of state and local governments trying to crack
down on things such as predatory lending, moving the OCC out of their
way.45 Others favor H.R. 4173 § 4407(a) for doctrinal reasons, like
federalism, for example. Here, a Federalist would favor the provision to
correct the wrongdoings of the Supreme Court in their overlooking the
40 The Office of Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) is the primary federal
regulator for nationally chartered banks.
41 Watters, 550 U.S. at 1. See WookBai Kim, Challenging the Roots ofSubprime
Mortgage Crisis: The OCC's Operating Subsidiaries Regulations and Watters v.
Wachovia Bank, 21 LoY. CONSUMER L. REV. 278, 280 (2009).
42 See Peterson, supra note 37, at 9.
43 Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2009, H.R. 4173, 111th
Cong. § 4407(a) (2d Sess. 2009) ("IN GENERAL-The Home Owners' Loan Act
(12 U.S.C. 1461 et seq.) is amended by inserting after section the following new
section: 'SEC. 6. STATE LAW PREEMPTION STANDARDS FOR FEDERAL
SAVINGS ASSOCIATIONS CLARIFIED'.").
" See Beam, supra note 34; Timothy R. McTaggart & Travis P. Nelson, House
Passes Major Financial Services Reform Package, PEPPER HAMILTON LLP
PUBLICATIONS, Dec. 29, 2009,
http://www.pepperlaw.com/publicationsupdate.aspx?ArticleKey-1673 ("the
language purports to overturn Watters, which allowed preemption to extend to
operating subsidiaries of national banks.").
45 See David J. Barron, Foreword: Blue State Federalism at the Crossroads, 3
HARv. L. & POL'Y REv. 1 (2009) ("The subprime crisis? Many state and local
governments were relatively quick to crack down on predatory lending, but they
soon found the nation's Comptroller of the Currency standing in their way.") (citing
Am. Fin. Servs. v. City of Oakland, 104 P.3d 813 (Cal. 2005) (describing the
efforts of Oakland to regulate the secondary market for subprime mortgages); cf
Jonathan D. Glater, Lender Agrees to Contribution of $ 2 Million to a Student
Fund, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 1, 2007, at Al 3 (describing New York State Attorney
General Andrew Cuomo's efforts to crack down on abusive lending in the student
loan industry); see also Catherine M. Brennan & Meghan S. Musselman,
Consumer Credit: Preemptions and Regulations, MD. B.J., Nov.-Dec. 2008, at 18,
20.
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Tenth Amendment as providing an answer to the preemption question.4 6
This combination of the interest of states' rights and the interest of
progressivism in the context of consumer protection laws, therefore, has
created some strange bedfellows for this debate.
III. WATTERS V WACHOVIA BANK
A. The Decision ofWatters v. Wachovia Bank
In Watters v. Wachovia Bank, the Supreme Court addressed the
question of whether Wachovia Bank's "mortgage lending activities remain
outside the governance of state licensing and auditing agencies when those
activities are conducted, not by a division or department of the bank, but by
the bank's operating subsidiary."' The court answered that question, in a
five-to-three decision,48 in the negative, largely stemming from the
conclusion that national banks are federal instrumentalities and that there
should be a presumption in favor of preemption from a concern for
protecting national banks from burdensome state regulatory interference.4 9
The court therefore included subsidiaries of national banks as being a
"national bank" for the purpose of the National Bank Act and HOLA.
Therefore, subsidiaries of national banks are not subject to any visitorial
powers,s0 except as provided by federal law.s'
46 Keith R. Fisher, Article: Towards a Basal Tenth Amendment: A Riposte to
National Bank Preemption ofState Consumer Protection Laws, 29 HARV. J.L. &
PUB. POL'Y 981 (2006). "One fundamental source of authority that, in theory,
would vitiate OCC's assertion of preemption, but is often overlooked by the courts,
is the Tenth Amendment. This Article suggests that the rescue of that Amendment
from its current undeserved desuetude is in order. Accomplishing such a
resurrection requires an analytical framework, and such a framework can be
distilled from the Framers' commentary and debates. It may, particularly in light of
the centrality ofjudicial review to the Framers' federalism design, provide the
Tenth Amendment with substantive content that the courts can credibly enforce."
47 Watters, 550 U.S. at 7.
48 Justice Thomas did not partake in the decision, reportedly because his son was
employed by Wachovia Bank. See Michael C. Tomkies, Ralph T. Wutscher &
Elizabeth L. Anstaett, Preemption and Federalism Developments: Watters Under
the Bridge, 63 Bus. LAw. 703, 704 (2008) (citing Linda Greenhouse, Ruling Limits
State Control ofBig Banks, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 18, 2007, at C2).
49 See Tomkies, supra note 48, at 705 (citing Watters, 550 U.S. at 18).
5o "Visitorial powers" refers to the authority to examine, supervise, regulate,
require information from and take enforcement action against a bank. Special
Interest-On Preemption and Visitorial Powers, QUARTERLY JOURNAL, Mar. 2004,
available at www.occ.treas.gov/qj/qj23-1/3-SpecialInterest.pdf
5 12 U.S.C. § 484(a) (2006) ("No national bank shall be subject to any visitorial
powers except as authorized by Federal law .... .").
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Petitioner Linda Watters,52 the state of Michigan's representative
for the case, characterized Wachovia's wholly-owned subsidiary as an
"affiliate" of the national bank." If it the operation was an "affiliate," it
would be subject to multistate control.54 The court disagreed with this
characterization on the grounds that 12 U.S.C. § 24 authorizes national
banks to use nonbank operating subsidiaries. 5 Furthermore, Watters
contended that if Congress meant to deny state visitorial powers, it would
have included affiliates in the National Banks Act's56 ban on state
regulation. The Court rejected that contention on two grounds. First, the
Court took exception to Watters' reliance on the intent of the 1864
Congress in enacting the statute, because operating subsidiaries were not
authorized until 1966. Secondly, the Court took the view that because
Congress made a clear distinction between what a subsidiary may do and
what other types of affiliates may do in the National Bank Act, Watters was
incorrect to characterize the operating subsidiary as an "affiliate." 59 The
Court concluded that the National Bank Act protects a national bank's
engagement in the "business of banking," whether conducted by the bank
itself or an operating subsidiary that is authorized by law to engage in the
52 Watters, 550 U.S. at 21 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (Watters was the Commissioner
of the Michigan Office of Insurance and Financial Services).
" Id. at 14.
54 d ("Watters characterizes them simply as "affiliates" of national banks, and
contends that even though they are subject to OCC's superintendence, they are also
subject to multistate control.").
ss Id.
56id.
1 12 U.S.C. § 484(a) (2006) (The Code on mentions national banks: "No national
bank shall be subject to any visitorial powers except as authorized by Federal
law.").
58 Watters, 550 U.S. at 18 (The majority of Ginsburg, Kennedy, Souter, Breyer and
Alito did not take an Originalist approach to this issue: "Over the past four decades,
during which operating subsidiaries have emerged as important instrumentalities of
national banks, Congress and OCC have indicated no doubt that such subsidiaries
are "subject to the same terms and conditions as national banks themselves).
59 d. at 18-19: "The NBA broadly defines the term "affiliate" to include "any
corporation" controlled by a national banks, including a subsidiary. An operating
subsidiary is therefore one type of "affiliate." But unlike affiliates that may engage
in functions not authorized by the NBA, e.g., financial subsidiaries, an operating
subsidiary is tightly tied to its parent by the specification that it may engage only
"in the business of banking" as authorized by the act."
(citing 12 U.S.C. § 221a(b) (2006); 12 U.S.C. § 24a(g)(3)(A) (2006); 12 C.F.R.
§5.34(e)(1)(2006)).
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same actions.60 Finally, the Court rejected Watters' claim under 12 CFR
§7.400661 that state law should apply because Federal law or the OCC
regulation does not provide for preemption on the grounds that regulation
of national bank operations is a "prerogative of Congress under the
Commerce and Necessary and Proper Clauses."62
In the dissenting opinion, Justice Stevens 63 proceeded from an
opposite presumption against federal preemption of state law, noting the
concern for the potential impact an alternative decision would have on
competitive equality between state and federal institutions.6 The dissent
focused on the fact that there had been no action from Congress
immunizing subsidiaries of national banks from state laws and that there
was no evidence that compliance with state laws would be unduly
burdensome for Wachovia's mortgage activities sufficient to find that the
subsidiary should not be preempted by state law.65 The dissent pronounced
more of an originalist opinion, concluding that preemption should not be
extended to operating subsidiaries because there was no express statutory
authority providing for federal preemption.
60 Watters, 550 U.S. at 19 ("[a] national bank has the power to engage in real estate
lending through an operating subsidiary, subject to the same terms and conditions
that govern the national bank itself.").
6112 C.F.R. § 7.4006 (2006) (Unless otherwise provided by Federal law or OCC
regulation, State laws apply to national bank operating subsidiaries to the same
extent that those laws apply to the parent national bank.).
62 Watters, 550 U.S. at 21 (citing Citizens Bank v. Alafabco Inc., 539 U.S. 52, 58
(2003) (per curium)).
63 Watters, 550 U.S. at 21 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (Justice Stevens was joined by
Justice Roberts and Scalia).
6 See Tomkies, supra note 48, at 706 (citing Watters, 550 U.S. at 23 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting)).
65 Id. at 23 (Until today, we have remained faithful to the principle that
nondiscriminatory laws of general application that do not "forbid" or "impair
significantly" national bank activities should not be pre-empted.) (citing, e.g.,
Barnett Bank, N. A. v. Nelson, 517 U.S. 25 (1996)).
66 See G. Marcus Cole, Protecting Consumers from Consumer Protection: Watters
v. Wachovia Bank, 270 CATO Sup. CT. REV. 251, 261-62 (2007) (concluding that
the very question that served as the point of disagreement between the majority and
the dissent was "whether a state-chartered operating subsidiary, which is never
mentioned by any federal statute (except Glass-Stegall's blanket prohibition of
them), could nevertheless invoke the sanctuary of federal preemption when a state
attempts to enforce state banking regulations on it.)").
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B. Various Interests Define Issue of Watters v. Wachovia Bank
Differently
Commentators were not in as much agreement over the central
issue in Watters v. Wachovia Bank as the Court was.67 Some commentators
focused on doctrinal issues of the case to find that the decision was
unreasonable. Others found the central issue to be more about practical
matters, such as whether an operating subsidiary with a national bank
parent will obtain a competitive advantage over banks operating in the same
state without a parent,69 or whether states should have regulatory authority
because they are better able to protect consumers.70 Some saw the dividing
line between the majority and minority as the majority worrying about
duplicative and burdensome regulation that would result without federal
preemption and the minority worrying about the loss of states engaging in
competitive regulatory-setting if they are not able to regulate operating
67Id. at 253 (arguing that the central issue in Watters was a policy choice of
limiting or enhancing state consumer protection legislation disguised as a doctrinal
one (i.e., federalism, originalism vs. nonoriginalism, or judicial activism vs.
judicial passivity).
68 Tomkies, supra note 48, at 707 (the authors focus on the extent to which
preemption must be based on specific statutory authority, Seemingly a doctrinal
issue); see also Kim, supra note 41, at 280 ("[T]his paper argues that the OCC's
construction is contrary to law and is unreasonable given the plain language of the
NBA, precedential case law and the structure of the NBA.").
69 Timothy D. Kravetz, Recent Decisions: National Bank Operating Subsidiaries
Are Subject to Exclusive Visitorial Authority by OCC as NBA and OCC
Regulations Preempt State Visitorial Authority Law: Watters v. Wachovia Bank, 46
DuQ. L. REv. 279 (2009) (arguing that while the competitive equality argument is
sound). "Ultimately, however, such arguments failed on sound reasoning by Justice
Ginsburg and the majority. In terms of competitive equality, it does not Seem that
operating subsidiaries will obtain a competitive advantage. For instance, while
Wachovia Mortgage for six years operated under the superintendence of Watters in
Michigan, it was not subject to OCC superintendence. If the minority view had
prevailed, Wachovia Mortgage would have been subject to both while its state
registered competitors were only subject to state regulation, arguably a competitive
disadvantage." Id. (citing Watters, 550 U.S. at 18; Brief for the Nat'l Ass'n of
Realtors as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 1415, Watters v. Wachovia
Bank, N.A., 550 U.S. 1 (2006) (No. 05-1342).
70 Cole, supra note 66, at 253 ("the real issue is whether, given our national credit
markets, states should have the extensive authority to impose cumbersome,
expensive, and indeed, irrational regulation on operating subsidiaries of national
banks.).
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subsidiaries." Regardless of the value of these opinions, the divergent
determinations as to what the real issue of Watters v. Wachovia Bank was
indicate that the decision divided virtually all interests concerned with
baking regulation.
The interests of the Originalists versus the non-Originalists were
divided, for example, between those who wanted to deny preemption
because there was no express authority for the OCC's construction7 and
those who favored preemption based on implied authority and the notion
that the intent of the 1864 Congress should have no bearing on the matter
because operating subsidiaries were not around until the mid-20h century.
For traditional conservatives, this case created a divide between Federalists
who wanted to scale back preemption powers for federal agencies and
Libertarians who favored preemption because of the recent explosion of
state consumer protection laws. 74 Similarly, for the same reasons,
Federalists who favored scaling back preemption were put at odds with
similarly-situated traditionally conservative economic interests who favor
less intrusive federal law over state law and therefore are for preemption.75
These divergent interests that even cut across traditional agreeable
positions indicate that the issue of Waters v. Wachovia Bank is not as
simple as it may seem. Therefore, the general question of whether federal
law should preempt state law for operating subsidiaries of national banks, if
addressed by forthcoming legislation, will also have divergent interests that
cut across traditionally harmonious interests.
IV. THE DUAL BANKING SYSTEM THROUGH A PREDATORY LENDING
LENS: STATE VS. FEDERAL
For some, the difference between federal and state consumer laws
is characterized as the difference between experimentation and progressive
state action and deregulation, and federal regulation. Others see the
71 See id, at 262-63 (concluding, however, that "beneath the surface a different
policy debate was brewing . .. The dissent accurately identifies the risks to
federalism posed by the Court's holding.").
72 Tomkies, supra note 48, at 707; Kim, supra note 41, at 280.
71 Watters, 550 U.S. at 18.
74 Cole, supra note 66, at 251. ("Put simply, the choice was one between form and
function, federalism and freedom . . . [t]his difficult choice divides not just the
Court but libertarians from Conservatives.").
7 Id. ("Should the state maintain significant power to regulate state chartered
subsidiaries of national banks, even if that meant the occasional enforcement of
misguided debilitating state consumer protection laws?).
76 Christopher L. Peterson, Federalism and Predatory Lending: Unmasking the
Deregulatory Agenda, 78 TEMP. L. REv. 1, 8 (1995) ("The thesis of my argument is
that current efforts to preempt state law have little or nothing to do with federalism
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balance of power between the federal and state consumer laws as a value in
and of itself, as it affords banks the opportunity to "forum shop" for the best
regulation, and differing laws compete to attract those banks, thus creating
a regulatory environment that promotes competition. 7 Characterized in
these two lights, the dual banking system has created either an opportunity
for different levels of government to experiment with new regulations to
protect consumers or a system whereby different levels of government
"race to the bottom" in an effort to compete for banks to regulate by
providing the least burdensome regulation.
A. The Dual Banking System
The dual banking system gives banks a choice as to the set of laws
and administrators under which they will operate.7 8 Importantly, banks are
able to do this both when they start up or as an existing bank; a state-
chartered bank may withdraw from the Federal Reserve System for
example under reciprocity statutes, national banks can convert into state
in general or uniformity in particular, but are, in fact, simply efforts to
deregulate.").
n Cole, supra note 66, at 275-76. "Explaining that the opportunity for state
chartered lending institutions to 'flee the jurisdiction' by becoming acquired by a
nationally chartered bank is not 'forum shopping' in the pernicious meaning of the
phrase. Forum shopping is bad when it occurs ex post, when parties to a transaction
seek a favorable outcome by seeking a biased arbiter. On the contrary, ex ante
forum shopping is what federalism is all about. Parties should exercise their
constitutional right to interstate travel, for example, and 'vote with their feet' when
encountering an inhospitable legal or regulatory climate. Debtors do this all the
time. Why should creditors be different? In other words, preemption of state
banking law in the narrow case of wholly owned operating subsidiaries of national
banks may actually promote and enhance federalism, by providing lenders with an
ex ante choice of legal regime, one that forces regulators to compete for their
'business.'
(citing, for example, G. Marcus Cole, The Federalist Cost ofBankruptcy
Exemption Reform, 74 AM. BANKR. L.J. 227, 229 (2000) (discussing "the market
for deadbeats" by considering how variations in laws can facilitate exit strategies
for certain kinds of debtors). See also Frank H. Buckley & Margaret F. Brinig, The
Market for Deadbeats, 25 J. LEGAL STuD. 201 (1996) (analyzing the factors that
cause debtors to migrate to more favorable jurisdictions).
78 Kenneth E. Scott, The Dual Banking System: A Model of Competition in
Regulation, 30 STAN. L. REv. 1, 8 (1977) ("The described regulatory
diversity in effect allows new banks to choose the set of laws and
administrators under which they will operate. For example, a group
wishing to enter the banking business may apply to the Comptroller for a
national bank charter or to the state for a state bank charter.").
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banks if the state law allows conversion.79 These justifications are
seemingly focused on the bank's side of the story, as they normally center
on the idea of protecting banks from restrictive regulationo or that it gave
banks a chance to avoid arbitrary supervision.8' From the consumer's
perspective, the opportunity for banks to pick and choose what regulations
and administrators could be seen as beneficial, if the result is decreased
costs because banks are not subject to burdensome regulation. 82
Alternatively, that same ability for banks to pick and chose their regulations
may be harmful to the consumer if those regulations would have provided
the consumers more protection and that protection is worth more than the
costs of the regulation. 83 Therefore, it is beneficial to examine the nature of
state versus federal consumer protections laws for the purposes of this
debate.
B. Predatory Lending Laws
One example that may expose the effect that the dual banking
system has on consumers and on banks is the predatory lending
environment. Here, borrowers lend to homeowners who frequently cannot
79 Id. at 8-9 ("Perhaps less evident-but in practice much more important-is the
fact that existing banks can change their laws and regulators") (citing 12 U.S.C. §
214(c) (1970) (2006); CAL. FIN. CODE §§ 2090, 2092 (West 1968); 16 Ill. COMP.
Stat. 1/2-120 (1973); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 17:9A- 154.1 (West 1963); N.Y. BANKING
LAW § 137 (McKinney 1971); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1121.01-.04 (LexisNexis
1968); 7 PA. STAT. ANN. § 1709 (West 1967)).
80 Scott, supra note 78, at 12 (citing Consolidation ofBank Examining and
Supervisory Functions: Hearings on H.R. 107 and H.R. 6885 Before the Subcomm.
on Bank Supervision and Insurance of the H. Comm. on Banking and Currency,
and Before the H. Comm. on Banking and Currency, 89th Cong. 120 (1965)
(statement of Archie K. Davis).
81 Id (citing Consolidation ofBank Examining and Supervisory Functions:
Hearings on H.R. 107 and H.R. 6885 Before the Subcomm. on Bank Supervision
and Insurance of the H. Comm. on Banking and Currency, and Before the H.
Comm. on Banking and Currency, 89th Cong. 120 (1965) (statement of Ralph
Zaun).
82 Richard L. Peterson, The Costs of Consumer Credit Regulation (Issues in
Banking Regulation, Reprint 13, 1979), available at
www.sbpm.gwu.edu/research/centers/fsrp/pdflReprintl3.pdf ("In the short-run,
commercial banks and taxpayers bear the costs of consumer credit regulation and
enforcement. In the longer-run, the costs of regulation are passed on to consumers
in one way or another. Bank management's who find consumer loan activities more
costly, less efficient and, therefore, less profitable to operate will either curtail such
operations and divert their capital to more profitable operations or else take steps to
increase the profitability of their consumer loan operations.").
83 See Nicholas Bagley, Crashing the Subprime Party: How the Feds Stopped the
States from Averting the Lending Mess, SLATE, Jan. 24, 2008,
http://www.slate.com/id/2182709/.
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pay their loans, however "predatory" loans are often hard to precisely
define.M Predatory lending is a pressing problem that garners much political
and media attention because the practice is heavily concentrated in low-
income neighborhoods and it impacts the elderly and racial minorities
disproportionately." Predatory lending has been estimated as costing
consumers around $9.1 billion annually in excess payments.
There are many ways the federal and state governments try to
prevent predatory lending, or at least ameliorate its consequences when it
does occur.87 One commentator, Christopher L. Peterson, compiled a study
of contemporary American law addressing the problems of predatory home
lending to conclude that there were roughly seven different principle
strategies employed [(1) debtor amnesty, (2) restrictions on permissible
contractual provisions, (3) anti-discrimination laws, (4) charitable lending,
(5) facilitation of cooperative credit institutions, (6) anti-deception laws,
and (7) price disclosure.]88
With amnesty-based policies, the government attempts to protect
the debtor by limiting the ability of creditors to collect debts.89  A
government might also attempt to protect consumers from predatory
lending by limitations on contracting, i.e., prohibiting unfair or abusive
8 Jonathan L. Entin & Shadya Y. Yazaback, City Governments and Predatory
Lending, 34 FORDHAM URB. L. J. 757, 757-59 (2007) ("Defining predatory lending
is difficult for two reasons. First, loan attributes may or may not be "predatory"
depending on the sophistication or financial position of the borrower. Second, the
definition of predatory lending cannot be static because the lending market is
always evolving in light of technological, regulatory, and judicial advancements.").
85 Id. (citing HUD-TREASURY TASK FORCE ON PREDATORY LENDING, CURBING
PREDATORY HOME MORTGAGE LENDING 47 (2000), available at
http://www.huduser.org/Publications/pdf/treasrpt.pdf; Paul S. Calem et al., The
Neighborhood Distribution ofSubprime Mortgage Lending, 29 J. REAL EST. FIN. &
EcoN. 393, 401 (2004); Paul S. Calem et al., Neighborhood Patterns of Subprime
Lending: Evidence from Disparate Cities, 15 HOUSING POL'Y DEBATE 603, 611
(2004)).
86 Burlingame, supra note 32, at 461 (citing ERIC STEIN, QUANTIFYING THE
ECONOMIC COSTS OF PREDATORY LENDING, REPORT FOR COALITION FOR
RESPONSIBLE LENDING (2001), available at http://www.responsiblelending.org).
8 Peterson, supra note 76, at 31. However, it should be noted that these strategies,
even when taken in combination with each other, are inadequate. Id. at 61 ("[t]he
bottom line is that each of the strategies discussed so far, even when considered
collectively, suffer from significant drawbacks that leave many borrowers
unprotected.").
88 Id. ("Roughly speaking, we have used seven principle strategies to prevent
predatory lending, or at least to ameliorate its consequences when it does occur.").
89 Id.
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contractual provisions.90 Additionally, federal and state governments may
attempt to prevent lenders from targeting borrowers based on an
impermissible bias through antidiscrimination laws.91 Federal and state
governments may also encourage banks to help meet the credit needs of
those who would not ordinarily receive a good rate through charitable-
lending rewards.92 Governments also facilitate cooperative credit
institutions where banks pool resources into a credit union and therefore are
able to create pools of low-cost funds from which to borrow, thereby
insulating themselves from financial predators.9 3 Or governments may
facilitate the use of anti-deception law, like the intentional tort of fraud, as a
defense for vulnerable consumer borrowers.94 Finally, federal and state
governments may attempt to protect consumers through disclosure and
education statutes that make it easier for consumers to know what they are
signing up for and compare products.95
Some commentators, including the commentator that compiled this
list96 consider these remedies inadequate because of the special situation
subprime borrowers are in, and because these remedies are designed to help
prime borrowers.97 For example, because subprime borrowers pose more
significant credit risks to creditors, subprime loans are often more
complicated than traditional loans, as they often have additional fees and
90 Id. at 34.
' Id. at 39. (At the federal level, the primary legislation includes the Fair Housing
Act (FHA) and the Equal Credit Opportunity Act (ECOA)).
92 Id. at 45 (The most prominent current example of this strategy with respect to
predatory home mortgage lending is the federal Community Reinvestment Act
(CRA). Congress concluded that public bank charters and deposit insurance create
a "continuing and affirmative obligation to help meet the credit needs of the local
communities in which they are chartered.").
9 Id. at 45 (Peterson goes on to explain, "[t]hese organizations, both federal and
state, have not prevented the recent entrenchment of predatory home mortgage
lending. This may be in part because the most vulnerable borrowers are often
beyond the reach of cooperative lenders.").
94 Peterson, supra note 76, at 46.
95 Id. at 51-53 (describing the Truth in Lending Act as the primary American
consumer credit regulation price disclosure statute) (citing 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1667
(2006)).
96 Peterson, supra note 87.
9 7 Arielle L. Katzman, Note, A Round Peg for a Square Hole: The Mismatch
Between Subprime Borrowers and Federal Mortgage Remedies, 31 CARDOZO L.
REv. 497, 544 (2009) ("[M]any current remedies were designed for prime
borrowers, and certain statutory provisions and regulations fail to meet the
particular needs of subprime borrowers"); see also Jessica Fogel, Comment, State
Consumer Protection Statutes: An Alternative Approach to Solving the Problem of
Predatory Mortgage Lending, 28 SEATTLE U. L. REv. 435, 438 (2005).
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restrictive terms.98 Similarly, subprime borrowers are generally considered
more vulnerable due to their economic status and the probability that they
may have other problems or they lack experience and knowledge of
complex financial transactions." Because these problems seemingly create
the perfect stormoo, predatory lending represents an excellent opportunity
to expose the dynamics of the dual banking system and how it promotes
competition for banks and protects consumers.
C. Federal Predatory Lending Laws
There are three major federal laws that govern predatory lending:
The Truth in Lending Act (TLA),'o' The Real Estate Settlements
Procedures Act (RESPA),102 and the Home Ownership and Equity
Protection Act'03 (HOEPA). TLA, passed in 1968, requires mortgage
lenders to disclose to borrowers certain information to facilitate an
understanding of the "true" cost of a loan and to help borrowers compare
the offer to other lenders.1' Similarly, RESPA, passed in 1974, which
9 Katzman, supra note 97, at 500 (citing Truth in Lending, 73 Fed. Reg. 44,522,
44,524 (July 30, 2008) ("[P]roducts in the subprime market tend to be complex,
both relative to the prime market and in absolute terms, as well as less standardized
than in the prime market.").
99 Id. (citing David Feldman & Shulamith Gross, Mortgage Default: Classification
Trees Analysis, 29 J. of Real Estate Economics 368-371 (2004) (discussing survey
evidence that borrowers with subprime loans are more likely to have experienced
major adverse life events (marital disruption; major medical problem; major spell
of unemployment; major decrease of income) and often use refinancing for debt
consolidation or home equity extraction); Heather M. Tashman, The Subprime
Lending Industry: An Industry in Crisis, 124 BANKING L.J. 407, 413 (2007)).
1oo By this I mean because sub-prime borrowers are likely to default on their loans,
creditors must account for this by making it even harder from the borrowers to pay
their loans. Therefore, the circumstantial result is that predatory lending is actually
making it harder for subprime borrowers to pay off their loans.
101 15 U.S.C. § 1501 (2006); OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, THE
TRUTH IN LENDING HANDBOOK (2008), available at
www.occ.treas.gov/handbook/til.pdf. The TILA, 15 U.S.C. § 1601, was enacted on
May 29, 1968, as title I of the Consumer Credit Protection Act (Pub. L. 90-32 1).
The TILA, implemented by Regulation Z (12 C.F.R. § 226), became effective July
1, 1969.
102 12 U.S.C. §§ 2601-17 (2006).
103 12 C.F.R. § 226.35(a) (2006).
1'0 Katzman, supra note 97, at 508; 15 U.S.C. § 1601(a) (2006) (prior to the
extension of credit, lenders must disclose to the borrower information such as the
loan's APR, finance charges, the total amount financed the number of payments,
and the payment schedule); see also Patricia A. McCoy, Rethinking Disclosure in a
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applies to federally-regulated mortgage loans,105 requires certain disclosures
at different points of a loan transaction.'0 6
In the subprime lending environment these statutes fall short of
providing substantial relief as disclosure-based requirements are not a good
match for the intricacies of subprime lending'07 and the requirements on
lenders are also hard to enforce. 08 Additionally, the remedies available
under these provisions do not provide much help, as they do not help the
borrower stay in their home and avoid foreclosure.109 Therefore, the federal
legislative framework of these two acts does not provide much help to
subprime borrowers outside of disclosure requirements, and any cause of
action they may have is seemingly blocked either because the statutes do
not address the root cause or the remedy would be meaningless given the
economic situation of the borrower."o
Finally, HOEPA, which amended TWA in 1994, prohibits the
initial lender from certain practices and requires lenders to consider the
borrower's ability to repay the loan prior to issuing the loan."' The
primary purpose of the Act was to reverse the practice of lenders targeting
residents "within certain geographic boundaries based on income, race or
ethnicity,"ll 2 and giving these targeted borrowers unfair terms.1 '3  While
World ofRisk-based Pricing, 44 HARv. J. ON LEGIS. 123, 131-38 (2007) (detailing
intricacies of timing for disclosures).
1os Katzman, supra note 97, at 508 (citing 12 U.S.C § 2602(1) (2006) (establishing
criteria for classification as a federally related mortgage loan). This definition
includes more than loans by federally regulated lenders and should cover most
subprime loans. See 2 WEST's FED. ADMIN. PRAc. § 1563 (4th ed. 2008) (noting
that the term encompasses virtually every residential real estate transaction closing
in the United States, including refinancings and subordinate mortgages.).
106 Katzman, supra note 97, at 508.
107 Id. at 510 (citing Christopher L. Peterson, Predatory Structured Finance, 28
CARDozo L. REv. 2185, 2250 (2007)) (assessing how "Consumer Protection Laws
Presume an Antiquated Model of Finance," which "hints at a fundamental
structural problem in the law.").
1os Katzman, supra note 97, at 510 ("This narrow statutory approach limits
available claims and ercts obstacles for establishing claims where available, in a
way that clashes with the reality of subprime transactions.").
' Id. (Explaining that the staying in the home and avoiding foreclosure is not an
available remedy despite the fact that for most subprime borrowers).
"o Id. at 518-23.
"' Id. (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1639 (2006) (enumerating additional disclosures and
warnings for qualifying loans along with other limitations such as no balloon
payments, prepayment penalties, or negative amortization)).
112 This practice is often referred to as "redlining."
113 Laura Dietrich, Note, Massachusetts's New Predatory Lending Law and the
Expanding Rift Between Federal and State Lending Protection, 26 B.C. THIRD
WORLD L.J. 169, 185 n.129 (2006) (citing S. REP. NO. 103-169, at 21 (1994),
reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1881, 1905).
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HOEPA does impose additional requirements and limitations on "high cost
mortgages," the Act explicitly excludes three major types of mortgages-
home purchase mortgages, reverse mortgages, and open-ended credit
mortgages-from protection.1 4  Furthermore, the Act very narrowly
defines what constitutes a "high cost mortgage," and as a result, only
extremely egregious loans are covered."'
HOEPA imposed additional disclosure requirements for "high cost
loans", including the mandate that the lender disclose to the potential
borrower that: they are not required to complete the transaction, that there is
a possibility that they could lose their home through foreclosure, and the
annual percentage rate, the monthly payment amount, and the maximum
amount to which the monthly payment could be increased during the course
of the loan.116 Additionally, HOEPA attempts to protect borrowers from
high pressure sales tactics by requiring a three-day waiting period before
the loan is finalized, giving the borrower a chance to take a step back and
think about the loan. 17 Finally, HOEPA prohibits certain misleading terms
from these high cost mortgages that might disguise the actual cost of the
loan." 8
While HOEPA imposes more than just disclosure requirements, the
narrow definition of what constitutes a "high priced mortgage" leaves out a
substantial amount of abusive loans." 9 Therefore, HOEPA was a step
114 Id. at 186-87 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1602(aa)(1)).
" Id. at 187 n.138 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1602(aa))( "[A]n otherwise qualifying
mortgage is regulated only if its interest rate exceeds the Treasury's rate of interest
by more than ten percent, or if the total points and fees, paid by the consumer at or
before closing, exceed eight percent of the total loan amount or $400, whichever is
greater.").
"
6 Id. at 187 n.141-42 (citing S. REP. No. 103-169, at 25).
" Id. at 188 n.145 (citing S. REP. No. 103-169, at 25).
118 Id. (The following terms are prohibited: "prepayment penalties, points on loan
amounts refinanced, default interest rates above the rate prior to the default, balloon
payments, negative amortization, or prepayment of more than two of the periodic
payments") (explaining, however, that the prohibition of these terms is not
absolute. Congress delegated to the Federal Reserve Board broad discretionary
authority to "exempt specific mortgage products or categories of products from the
rohibitions.").
9 Id. at 188-89 (citing Eric Stein, Quantifying The Economic Cost ofPrefatory
Lending, 7 COALITION FOR RESPONSIBLE LENDING 200,
http://www.responsiblelending.org/pdfs/Quantl0-01.pdf ("Fannie Mae, the [North
Carolina] General Assembly, and Washington Mutual have all found that points
and fees greater than five percent are abusive." Additionally, the Coalition for
Responsible Lending believes that points and fees above three percent are abusive
and constitute predatory lending.)).
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towards accounting for the special needs of the predatory lending problem
for the federal government in that it recognized that disclosure alone does
not protect the subprime borrower. The shortcomings of this law, however,
become clear when compared to subsequent state laws. It becomes clear,
then, that state law is more responsive to the needs of borrowers and federal
law is more responsive to the needs of lenders.
D. State Predatory Lending Laws
The inadequacy of federal law for regulating subprime lending has
been recognized by many state legislatures and agencies. That recognition,
paired with rising consumer complaints about the problem of predatory
lending, has caused many state and local regulators to respond with their
own laws.12 0 Generally speaking, state predatory lending laws are more
applicable to the subprime situation because they limit what contracts the
state will honor in the context of home mortgage loans by broadly defining
what is a "high cost mortgage" and paying less attention to disclosure.121
North Carolina was the first state to adopt an anti-predatory lending
statute in 1999 when they enacted S. 1149 in 1999.122 The law, enacted as
part of the state's general usury law, 23 placed restrictions and limitations
on certain types of home loans as well as general restrictions on all home
loans.124 The statute restricts borrowers from: loan flipping,12 5 financing of
120 See Burlingame, supra note 32, at 468 (citing Elizabeth Renaurt, Toward One
Competitive and Fair Mortgage Market: Suggested Reforms in a Tale of Three
Markets Point in the Right Direction, 82 TEx. L. REv. 421, 422 (2003)) ("Most
states entered the predatory lending arena Seeking to cure deficiencies associated
with HOEPA. However, upon further study many states concluded that the actual
problem runs much deeper and have sought to impose other requirements on
potential predatory lenders. State legislators therefore seem to be more cognizant of
the cognitive limitations and biases that consumers deal with in making financial
decisions."). See also Dietrich, supra note 113, at 200 (describing that the ultimate
passage of a Massachusetts predatory lending law is the result of the "legislature's
recognition of the emergent need to stop the growth of abusive lending practices)
(citing Thomas Grillo, Bill to Curb Predatory Lending Backed, BOSTON GLOBE,
Mar. 15, 2004, at B2 (describing support for the PHLPA bill)).
121 See Nicholas Bagley, Note, The Unwarranted Regulatory Preemption of
Predatory Lending Laws, 79 N.Y.U. L. REv. 2274, 2299 (2004).
122 See Burlingame, supra note 32, at 468 (citing 1999 N.C. Gen. Sess. Laws 332
(codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. § § 24-1.1 A to 24-10.2 (2009))).
123 Interest rate regulation.
124 Id. (citing Donald C. Lampe, Wrong From the Start? North Carolina's
"Predatory Lending" Law and the Practice vs. Product Debate, 7 CHAP. L. REV.
135, 135 (2004); Donald C. Lampe, The North Carolina "Predatory Lending"
Usury Statute--S.B. 1149, 55 CONSUMER FIN. L.Q. REP. 81 (2001)).
125 Id. (citing N.C. GEN. STAT. § 24-10.2(c) (2009)); see also Julie L. Williams &
Michael S. Bylsma Federal Preemption and Federal Banking Agency Responses
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single premium insurance,126 and encouraging default in the refinance of
debtl 27 for all types of home loan transactions. If a loan is considered a
"high cost loan,"l 28 there are further restrictions that limit what a creditor
may offer. For example, a creditor may not offer a high cost loan until the
borrower has received home-ownership counseling, and the creditor
believes that the borrower can repay the loan.129 Finally, the law also has a
blanket prohibition against repayment penalties for home mortgage loans of
$150,000 or less.13 0
Following North Carolina, many other states enacted similar
versions of predatory lending laws. 31 As of 2006, more than thirty states
have adopted statutory or regulatory schemes designed to address predatory
lending.132 However, the extent to which those laws differ from existing
to Predatory Lending, 59 Bus. LAW 1193 n.15 (citing, U.S. DEP'T OF TREASURY
AND U.S. DEP'T HOUSING AND URBAN DEv., CURBING PREDATORY HOME
MORTGAGE LENDING: A JOINT REPORT 73-74 (2000) [hereinafter Treasury-HUD
Joint Report], available at http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/reports/treasrpt.pdf)
(explaining that Loan flipping is generally understood to mean the refinancing of a
loan for the main purpose of a lender garnishing additional fees at little or no
economic benefit to the borrower.).
126 Id. (citing N.C. GEN. STAT. § 24-10.2(b) (2009)).
127Id
128 Id. (explaining: "A North Carolina loan will be considered a high-cost loan,
subject to the enhanced restrictions, if it meets any one of three triggers: (1) the
APR is greater than ten percentage points above the comparable U.S. Treasury
security; (2) the points and fees exceed five percent of the total loan amount; or (3)
the prepayment penalty exceeds two percent of the amount prepaid.").
129 Id. (citing C. Bailey King, Jr., Preemption and the North Carolina Predatory
Lending Law, 8 N.C. BANKING INST. 377, 380 (2004) (in addition, high cost loans
are subject to a variety of term restrictions, for example, both balloon payments and
negative amortizations are prohibited); see also N.C. GEN. STAT. § 24-11.1 E
(2009).
130 See Dietrich, supra note 113, at 195 n.200 (citing Robert G. Quercia, Michael
A. Stegman & Walter R. Davis, Assessing the Impact ofNorth Carolina's
Predatory Lending Law, 15 HOUSING POL'Y DEBATE 573, 597 (2004), available at
http://www.fanniemaefoundation. org/programs/hpd/pdf/hpd_1503 Quercia.pdf).
13' Id. at 576-77 n.4.
132 See Julia P. Forrester, Still Mortgaging the American Dream: Predatory
Lending, Preemption, and Federally Supported Lenders, 74 U. CIN. L. REV. 1303,
1319 (2006) (citing FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 494.0079, 494.00791 (West Supp. 2005);
GA. CODE ANN. § 7-6A-1 to 7-6A-13 (2004); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 24-1.1E (2003);
N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 46:1OB-24 to 46:1OB-35 (West Supp. 2005); N.Y. BANKING
LAW § 6-1 (McKinney Supp. 2005); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1349.25-1349.37
(2002); 63 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 456.501-456.524 (West Supp. 2005)); see also,
Butera & Andrews, http:// www.butera-
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federal laws varies tremendously. For example, as of 2006, approximately
eleven states have enacted predatory lending laws that are substantially
similar to existing federal law or that they are supported by the subprime
lending industry.133 However, there are approximately eleven other states'34,
as of 2006, that have enacted legislation that has been characterized as
"moderate to strong."
One of those "moderate to strong" laws, the Predatory Home Loan
Practices Act, was passed in Massachusetts in August of 2004.1s The law,
like North Carolina's, defines "high costs mortgages" and places
restrictions and imposes requirements on these loans for both lenders and
borrowers.' 36 Importantly, the Massachusetts law broadly defines what
constitutes a "high cost mortgage" as loans that either have annual interest
rates in excess of eight percent, the yield on U.S. Treasury securities, or
have total points and fees in excess of the greater of five percent of the total
loan amount or $400.137 For "high cost loans," the creditor must receive
certification that the borrower attended counseling from a third-party
nonprofit organization about the loan transaction. 13 8 Additionally, the law
requires that lenders have a reasonable belief that the borrower will be able
to meet the scheduled payments for the loan based on a number of financial
factors.13 9 The law also attempts to reduce loan flipping by prohibiting
lenders from knowingly refinancing a home loan that was "consummated
within the prior sixty months... unless the refinancing is in the borrower's
interest."l 40 Finally, the law also governs the remedies for victims of the
law by preventing lenders from forcing borrowers to pursue their claims in
particular forums that are more costly, less convenient "or more dilatory for
andrews.comlegislativeupdates/directory/State/Legislature/Bills/sbc/StateBillChart
2005.pdf (last visited Mar. 25, 2010).
133 id
134 Id. (these states are: Arkansas, Georgia, Illinois, Massachusetts, New Jersey,
New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, South Carolina and West Virginia).
13 Dietrich supra note 113, at 200 (citing Predatory Home Loan Practices Act,
2004 Mass. Acts 268).
136 Id. at 200-01 (citing Predatory Home Loan Practices Act, 2004 Mass. Acts 268).
'"Id. at 200.
138 Id. at 201 (citing MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 183C, § 3 (2004)).
39Id. at 202 n.270 (citing MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 183C, §4 (2004)) (the author goes
on to explain that the lack of clear guidance as to how to determine whether a
borrower will or will not be able to make a repayment could have the unintended
consequence for reducing the amount of credit available because the lender may be
hesitant); see also Ann McDonald, State Anti-Predatory Lending Laws: More
Harm Than Help Ass'N OF COMTY. ORGANIZERS FOR REFORM Now, Aug. 22,
2003, http://www.acom.org/index.php?id=8313&tx ttnews [pointer]
=1&tx ttnews[tt news] =9004&txttnews[backPid] =2777&cHash=ba487865bc).
140 id. at 203 n.278 (citing MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 183C, § (28)(c) (2004)).
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the resolution of a dispute than a judicial forum."l 4' This prevents lenders
from forcing borrowers to submit their claims through arbitration, even
when there is a mandatory arbitration clause, provided that arbitration is
found to be more costly, dilatory or less convenient.142
V. COMPARING FEDERAL AND STATE PREDATORY LENDING LAWS
Federal laws dealing with predatory lending seemingly pay too
much attention to disclosure requirements, and when they do impose
restrictions or requirements other than disclosure, they define "high cost"
mortgages too narrowly to account for a substantial amount of abusive
loans. In contrast, the state laws of North Carolina and Massachusetts have
a broader definition of what constitutes a "high cost" loan.143 Additionally,
while the Home Ownership and Equity Protection Act requires a three-day
cooling period before the loan is finalized,'" both Massachusettsl 45 and
North Carolina 46 require that the borrower receive counseling and the
lender to have a reasonable belief that the borrower will be able to make
scheduled payments. For the subprime lending environment, the
requirement of counseling is much more protective for borrowers than the
requirement of a waiting period because counseling forces a borrower to
discuss the loan with an expert who is better able to identify the pitfalls or
141 Id. at 203-04 (citing MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 183C, §13 (2004)) (That "any
provision of a home mortgage loan that requires a borrower to assert a claim or
defense in "a forum that is less convenient, more costly, or more dilatory for the
resolution of a dispute than a judicial forum ... is unconscionable and void.").
142 id.
143 Id. at 200 ("PHLPA is an aggressive response to the abusive lending practices
that are most harmful to borrowers. Perhaps most significantly, PHLPA defines a
"high cost mortgage" loan very broadly. High cost mortgage loans are defined as
loans that either have annual interest rates in excess of 8% the yield on U.S.
Treasury securities or have total points and fees in excess of the greater of five
percent of the total loan amount or $400. Thus, PHLPA defines high cost mortgage
loans similarly to NCPLL, eschewing HOEPA's much more narrow definition.").
(citing Predatory Home Loan Practices Act, 2004 Mass. Acts 268; MASs. GEN.
LAWS ch. 183C, § 2 (2004)).
'4See Dietrich supra note 113, at 187-88 n. 145 (citing S. REP. No. 103-169, at
25).
145 Id. at 200 (citing Predatory Home Loan Practices Act, 2004 Mass. Acts 268);
Id. at 201 (citing MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 183C, § 3 (2004)).
146 See Burlingame, supra note 32, at 468 (citing C. Bailey King, Jr., Preemption
and the North Carolina Predatory Lending Law, 8 N.C. BANKING INST. 377, 380
(2004) (In addition, high cost loans are subject to a variety of term restrictions, for
example, both balloon payments and negative amortizations are prohibited); see
also, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 24-11.1E (2003).
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hidden dangers of the loan than the borrower.147 This protection, however,
is downplayed by the high frequency with which lenders change terms
immediately before closing.148
Furthermore, when comparing the growth or decline of predatory
lending practices of North Carolina, after the enactment of its Predatory
Lending law, the comparison with national trends makes it apparent that the
state law is more protective than the federal. In a study conducted by the
University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, researchers found that North
Carolina experienced a three percent decline in overall subprime loan
origination compared to an increase at the national level.14 9 The decline in
subprime lending was caused by a twenty percent drop in subprime
refinance lending as subprime home purchased lending experienced
seventy-two percent growth. 50 The research concluded, however, that
"since the most abusive subprime lending involves refinancing existing
loans, we would expect a good law to result in a decline in home
refinancing loans generally and in predatory refinancing loans in
particular."' 5 ' Therefore, the University of North Carolina researchers
concluded that the post-law decline in refinance loans paired with a healthy
growth in home purchases meant that the North Carolina predatory lending
Law was a success.152
Another indication of state governments being more active than the
federal government is seen through the enforcement of predatory lending
laws and the restitution and fines for predatory lending, and other consumer
protection violations. Here too, states appear to be more active as the
Director of Financial Institutions in the State of Washington, Helen P.
147 See Dietrich supra note 113, at 201 (citing MASS. GEN. LAWS ch.183C, § 3
(2004)).
148 Id. ("The counseling requirement, though beneficial, is not a panacea. For
instance, counseling does not cue harms caused by a lender who uses outright
deception by changing term immediately before closing.").
149 Id. at 190 n. 174 (citing Robert G. Quercia, Michael A. Stegman & Walter R.
Davis, Assessing the Impact ofNorth Carolina's Predatory Lending Law, 15
HouSING POL'Y DEBATE 573, 586 (2004), available at
http://www.fanniemaefoundation. org/programs/hpd/pdf/hpd 1503_Quercia.pdf
("North Carolina's three percent decline is notable when compared with the
increases in subprime lending that occurred in other states and regions. During the
same time period, there was a seventeen percent increase in subprime loan
originations. Similarly, there was an eighteen percent increase in subprime lending
in the rest of the South. States bordering North Carolina also experienced increases
in subprime lending that ranged between three percent and twenty five percent.").
50 d
's' Id at 588; see also Dietrich supra note 113, at 198 (noting that subprime
refinance loans are recognized as the form of loan that most frequently has
predatory terms).
52 Dietrich supra note 113, at 201.
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Howell, noted that "in 2002 alone, the states recovered over $500 million in
restitution and fines for predatory lending and other consumer protection
violations, compared to only $7 million collected by the OCC."'53
The OCC has responded to claims about their lack of protection by
stating that those state laws are detrimental to consumers and the economy
because they decrease the amount of credit availablel 54 for low-income,
high-risk borrowers, or increase its costs.' Regardless of the merits of this
claim,'56 these statements, together with a comparison of the effect of the
North Carolina law on subprime lending to trends at the national level,
clearly indicate that, at least for states with "moderate to strong" consumer
protection laws'5 , state law provides more restrictions for mortgage lenders
in the subprime context then the existing federal laws.
VI. WHY Do BANKS OPERATE THROUGH SUBSIDIARIES?
A. How often do they use Subsidiaries?
In 2005, information compiled by the Federal Reserve System
indicates that mortgage companies received more than sixty percent of all
home loan applications, despite the fact that such companies only made up
153 See Dietrich, supra note 113, at 198 (citing CTR. FOR RESPONSIBLE LENDING,
ANALYSIS OF OCC GUIDELINES ESTABLISHING STANDARDS FOR RESIDENTIAL
MORTGAGE LENDING PRACTICES 4 (2005), available at
http://www.responsiblelending.org/pdfs/pa-OCCGuidelines-0205.pdf).
154 The intent of this section is not to speculate as to whether more or less laws or
enforcement actions are better for consumers; rather, it describes which regulatory
environment banks would most prefer.
1ss See Burlingame, supra note 32, at 479 (citing Comptroller of Currency.
Economic Issues in Predatory Lending (OCC Working Paper, 2003); Roberto G.
Quercia, Michael A. Stegman & Walter R. Davis, Assessing the Impact ofNorth
Carolina's Predatory Lending Law, 15 HOUSING POL'Y DEBATE 573, 578-79
(2004) (discussing the results of various studies that have examined the impact of
North Carolina's Predatory Lending law on the availability of subprime credit)).
156 Interestingly, studies have found that a decrease in the total amount of predatory
loans either does not decrease the total amount of credit or does not have a clear
impact on the total amount of credit. See Burlingame, supra note 32, at 479 (citing
Roberto G. Quercia, Michael A. Stegman & Walter R. Davis, Assessing the Impact
ofNorth Carolina's Predatory Lending Law, 15 HOUSING POL'Y DEBATE 573, 578-
79 (2004) (discussing the results of various studies that have examined the impact
of North Carolina's Predatory Lending law on the availability of subprime credit).
See also supra pt. III.B, for a review of the main provisions of S. 1149.
157 See supra pt. IV D.
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around twenty percent of the total number of lenders. 58 Of those mortgage
companies in that study, only fifteen percent were not affiliated with
federally-regulated depository institutions, and they were therefore not
subject to federal regulation.'" While these numbers are largely
speculative and hard to come by, the benefits for a nationally chartered
bank engaging in predatory loan practices through an operating subsidiary
is indicative of the tendency for banks to engage in such an action.
B. Motivations for Operating Through a Subsidiary
Given the widespread recognition of the problems associated with
predatory lending, the risks associated with such a practice present
challenges for banks seeking to supply subprime loans. Banks using
operating subsidiaries, instead of fully integrating the lending operation into
their company, do so in order to circumvent the risks that come from
subprime lending.16 0 The most significant advantage of a bank issuing its
predatory loans through a subsidiary is to insulate the bank from the
liability that comes from the riskier practice because the subsidiary has a
separate legal status.' 6' Practically speaking, this allows a bank to avoid
litigation risks that come from their predatory lending operation.
Furthermore, banks can minimize reputational harm from their predatory
lending operation, due to high rate of foreclosures, litigation and public
awareness of their practice.162 Finally, the operating subsidiary, as a non-
bank mortgage company, is sheltered from "safety and soundness
regulations,"' such as the capital requirements that are applicable to the
158 See Entin, supra note 84, at 781 (citing Robert B. Avery et al., Higher-Priced
Home Lending and the 2005 HAiDA Data, FED. RES. BULL. Sept. 2006, at Al29)
(noting that this study should be read with caution because it only covers eighty
percent of the countries home lending.)
159 Id.
160 See Kim, supra note 41, at 283.
161 Id. (explaining that National banks have established operating subsidiaries
basically to insulate themselves from the effect of the failure of the subsidiaries and
thereby could maintain their safety and soundness.) (citing Rules, Policies and
Procedures for Corporate Activities, 61 Fed. Reg. 60,342, 60,354 (Nov. 27, 1996)
(explaining that a separate subsidiary structure can reduce risks of new activities by
distinguishing the subsidiary's activities from those of the parent bank as a legal
matter) (citation omitted)); see also Watters, 127 S. Ct. at 1585 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) (explaining that "the primary advantage of maintaining an operating
subsidiary as a separate corporation is that it shields the national bank from the
operating subsidiaries' liabilities) (citing United States v. Bestfoods, 524 U.S. 51,
61(1998)).
162 id
163 Id. ("Also, §§ 23A and 24B of the Federal Reserve Act, which govern
transactions between a bank and its affiliates, do not apply to the bank's
transactions with its operating subsidiaries. Thus, for instance, banks can make
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parent bank.' This exemption permits the subsidiary to obtain unlimited
funds from the parent bank on favorable terms for the operating
subsidiaries. 6 5 Therefore, a national bank operating through a subsidiary
for their predatory loan practices is able to limit liability and criticism for
their operation, and the subsidiary is offered more favorable regulatory
environment with which to operate. Therefore, despite concrete numbers
on the incidence of nationally chartered banks using operating subsidiaries,
the benefits that come from such an organization make it clear that these
subsidiaries have a sizeable role in the predatory lending environment.
C. State vs. Federal Law a Motivation as Well?
What are not addressed by these motivations are the advantages
that come with federal regulations. For a state chartered mortgage company,
becoming a subsidiary of a nationally-chartered bank comes with it the
added bonus of having federal law preempt state law. While state laws are
the result of calls for enhancing consumer protection, the OCC has a
different motivation, as defined by their own mission statement - "to ensure
a stable and competitive national banking system."l 66 This might explain
why the OCC has echoed commentators who have stated that state
consumer protection laws are detrimental to consumers and the economy
because they decrease the amount of credit available for high-risk
borrowers or they increase the cost of credit.167 Also explaining this
transactions with their operating subsidiaries without the application of the
percentage-of-capital limitations") (citing 12 U.S.C. § 371c(a), (b) (2006) ("A
bank's covered transactions--such as extension of credit and purchasing assets--
with one affiliate and all affiliates cannot exceed ten percent and twenty percent of
the bank's capital respectively. Also, covered transactions must be fully secured by
qualifying collateral and basically the bank cannot purchase low-quality asset from
affiliates.")).
1" Id. (citing OCC, MORTGAGE BANKING: COMPTROLLER'S HANDBOOK 5-6 (Mar.
1998), available at http://www.occ.treas.gov/handbook/mortgage.pdf; U.S. GEN.
ACCOUNTING. OFFICE, OCC PREEMPTION RULES: OCC SHOULD FURTHER CLARIFY
THE APPLICABILITY OF STATE CONSUMER PROTECTION LAWS TO NATIONAL BANKS
24 n.30 (2006), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d06387.pdf (citing the
OCC's statement that using an operating subsidiary has advantages in "transactions
with affiliates, regulatory capital requirements, and accounting considerations.")).
165 Id.
166 See Dietrich, supra note 113, at 199 (citing The Office of the Comptroller of the
Currency's Rules on National Bank Preemption and Visitorial Powers: Hearing
Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, 108th Cong. 18-19
(2004)).
167 See Burlingame, supra note 32, at 479 (citing Comptroller of Currency,
Economic Issues in Predatory Lending (OCC Working Paper, 2003); (Roberto G.
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approach may be the fact that the OCC is funded by national banks.'6 8
Therefore, it seems clear that the preemption of state law is another reason
why federally-chartered banks would want to operate through a subsidiary
instead of fully integrating the operation into their company.
VII. EFFECTS OF DESTROYING FEDERAL PREEMPTION
A bank's use of an operating subsidiary for mortgage lending offers
competitive advantages. However, it also contributes to deregulation that
many argue destroyed the subprime market. The OCC has considered a
bank's use of an operating subsidiary structure as "a desirable way to meet
rapid changes in the banking industry."169 Alternatively, commentators
assert that the main problem that caused the failure of the subprime
mortgage market, looser lending standards and regulatory failure to curb
such action, is fundamentally attributable to federal preemption.170 Given
that a bank's use of an operating subsidiary has resulted in federal
preemption, operating subsidiaries can be viewed as a contributing factor to
the failure of the subprime mortgage market.
Legislation reversing federal preemption seemingly pays more
attention to fears over loose lending standards and a weak regulatory
system than the competitive advantages that come with a bank's utilization
Quercia, Michael A. Stegman & Walter R. Davis, Assessing the Impact ofNorth
Carolina's Predatory Lending Law, 15 HOUsING POL'Y DEBATE 573, 578-79
(2004) (discussing the results of various studies that have examined the impact of
North Carolina's Predatory Lending law on the availability of subprime credit.).
16 See Dietrich, supra note 113, at 199 (citing The Office of the Comptroller ofthe
Currency's Rules on National Bank Preemption and Visitorial Powers: Hearing
Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, 108th Cong. 18-19
(2004)).
169 See Kim, supra note 41, at 295 (citing Investment Securities; Bank Activities
and Operations; Leasing, 66 Fed. Reg. 34,784, 34,788 (July 2, 2001) (codified at 12
C.F.R. § 7.4006) ("For decades national banks have been authorized to use the
operating subsidiary as a convenient and useful corporate form for conducting
activities that the parent bank could conduct directly.").
0 Id. at 289 (citing Ben S. Bemanke, Chairman, Fed. Res. Speech at the Women
in Housing and Finance and Exchequer Club Joint Luncheon: Financial Markets,
the Economic Outlook, and Monetary Policy (Jan. 10, 2008), available at
www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/bemanke2008O 110a.htm (expressing
that the financial turmoil was complicated by a number of factors); U.S. DEP'T OF
THE TREASURY, BLUEPRINT FOR A MODERNIZED FINANCIAL REGULATORY
STRUCTURE 78 (2008), available at
http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/reports/Blueprint.pdf (highlighting regulatory
loopholes in the U.S. oversight system for the mortgage origination market)); see
also Christopher Peterson, supra note 76, at 96-97 (arguing that preemption is
consistent with a deregulatory agenda).
2010 Watter's About to Run Dry For National Banks Using 311
Operating Subsidiaries to Circumvent Progressive State
Consumer Protection Laws
of an operating subsidiary.' 7' Such a consideration downplays the costs
associated with national banks having to deal with "variant and disparate
risks associated with disparate regulatory and economic conditions in each
state." 72 In effect, then, proposed legislation reversing federal preemption
for operating subsidiaries will force national banks to choose between
circumventing liability and the costs of subjecting their lending operations
to more onerous state regulation that varies significantly from state to state.
As an initial matter, making such a choice will require national
banks to devote time and resources to such considerations. Practically, this
will take resources away from traditional economies of scale considerations
that contribute to their competitive position in the marketplace. State-
chartered banks and banks of other countries will not have the same burden,
and this could result in national banks competitive position being weakened
by the practical effects of reversing federal preemption for operating
subsidiaries.
Additionally, this consideration will affect a national bank's
consideration of whether or not to acquire lending operations that are state-
chartered. Because a national bank must now fully integrate a lending
operation to avoid state regulation, the prohibitive cost of increased liability
that would result from integration could render such an acquisition
inefficient.
The decision a national bank will make as to whether or not to
integrate a state-charted lending operation or to acquire a local lending
operation will indicate the value banks place on considerations of liability
and a soft regulatory environment. If national banks continue to operate
their lending practices through an operating subsidiary that is now state
regulated, this would indicate that banks value the decreased liability that
comes with such an organization. However, if national banks choose to
fully integrate, this will indicate that banks value lenient regulation more
than decreased liability.
These value determinations will also provide clarity on the debates
surrounding Watters v. Wachovia Bank and the dual banking system. If
national banks favor a better regulatory environment over liability concerns,
this may indicate that the benefits of a dual banking system outweigh the
costs of increased liability. Alternatively, if national banks choose to submit
their operating subsidiaries to state regulation, this may indicate that the
171 See generally Kim, supra note 41, at 323 (concluding "that the recent subprime
mortgage turbulence may be a "necessary consequence" of the OCC's preemption
since 2001, restructuring the OCC's regulatory scheme for operating subsidiaries
can contribute to addressing problems in the subprime mortgage market.").
172 Cole, supra note 66, at 259.
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advantages of a dual banking system whereby regulators compete for
customers to regulate does not outweigh the institutional costs of
integration.
If the purpose of reversing federal preemption for operating
subsidiaries of national banks is truly to increase consumer protection
through increased regulation, this will only be furthered if the cost of
integration is so high that national banks will submit to state regulation of
their operating subsidiaries. Such a result would indicate that banks could
efficiently operate with increased predatory lending laws, making the case
that increased consumer protection laws are not so prohibitive on banks that
they end up hurting consumers. Alternatively, if banks choose to integrate
their operating subsidiaries in order to keep those operations federally
regulated, this indicates that increased consumer protection laws are so
harmful on banks that they would rather incur significant costs than submit
to progressive state regulation. Such a result may indicate that increased
consumer protection laws are so costly for banks that they will actually
harm consumers.
The result of the choice banks must make, however, is likely to be
driven by numerous considerations that will vary from bank to bank,
making observing a significant trend in the predatory lending market
unlikely. Nevertheless, any contribution that the reversal of federal
preemption for operating subsidiaries of national banks will have to make
this sharply divided debate over preemption and the dual banking system
more clear will be beneficial.
VII. CONCLUSION
Creation of the Consumer Financial Protection Agency has
implications that go well beyond the traditional debate over its passage.
Ostensibly, the bill seems to be a compromise between Democrats wishing
to create a new federal agency and Republicans who would like to limit the
federal government's power over national banks. However, upon analysis
of the environment that will ensue, it appears that Democrats will be able to
have their cake and eat it too. As a result of this legislation, many
nationally-chartered banks that operate their loan operations through a
state-charted operating subsidiary will face a choice: submit to state
regulation or increase liability.
They can either submit to regulation by progressive state law that
focuses more on consumer protection than competition. If they choose this
path, they will continue to have the advantage of limiting liability for the
actions of their most risky operation, limiting reputational risk that results
from litigation or foreclosures, and continuing to bypass federal regulations
that govern the reallocation of capital they are allowed to pass between the
institutions.
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Or, they can attempt to continue to have such operations regulated
by the federal government, whose major interest is currently the promotion
of a competitive banking environment, by fully integrating subsidiaries into
their parent institutions. Under this choice, they will lose all the benefits
that come from the risk aversion that results from operating their most
dangerous practice through a subsidiary, but they could continue to operate
in an environment that gives a high priority to banking interests.
On the whole, age-old debates over the value of a dual-banking
system and whether increased consumer protection laws actually benefit
consumers are immensely involved in this proposed legislation. For those
who believe that the failure of the subprime lending market was the result
of deregulation and loose lending standards, destroying federal preemption
for operating subsidiaries addresses that problem by subjecting those
entities to more onerous state regulation. Alternatively, for those who think
consumer protection only is furthered by making banks more competitive,
destroying federal preemption for operating subsidiaries of national banks
is a step in the wrong direction as there will be less of regulators competing
for banks to regulate by offering the most competitive terms.
More important than the doctrinal approaches and the political
divides of the debate over preemption and consumer protection is
recognition of the fact that banks will face a choice that seemingly will
make them choose the lesser of two evils. While the numerous variables
that may factor into a bank's decision makes a large trend unlikely, any
observable trend may provide some much needed clarity on this sharply
divided debate over whether consumer protection laws benefit consumers.
It seems clear then, that the proposed legislation destroying federal
preemption for operating subsidiaries of national banks is properly placed
within the same bill as legislation that would create a Consumer Financial
Protection Agency.
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